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Abstract. We are grateful to all discussants of our re-visitation for
their strong support in our enterprise and for their overall agreement
with our perspective. Further discussions with them and other leading
statisticians showed that the legacy of Theory of Probability is alive
and lasting.
1. ON BERNARDO’S COMMENTS
We cannot but agree with most issues raised by
Professor Bernardo, first and foremost the impor-
tant distinction between testing and estimation. The
multidimensional Jeffreys prior (for estimation) is
certainly not formally defined within Theory of Prob-
ability and the multiplication of cases in the book
does not help. We alas have no clear explanation as
to why most Jeffreys priors produce proper posteri-
ors for all datasets. While Lindley–Jeffreys’s para-
dox may be upsetting (although it mostly highlights
the discrepancy between the frequentist and the
Bayesian answers) we, however, consider the attempt
to create a testing Jeffreys prior in Section 5.2 as an
interesting if incomplete attempt, concretized much
later by Bayarri and Garcia-Donato (2007). We un-
derstand Professor Bernardo’s point of view on Bayes
factors, but still resist the temptation to throw away
this useful tool, as discussed below in conjunction
with Professor Lindley’s comments. We are nonethe-
less sympathetic to the intrinsic discrepancy mea-
Christian P. Robert is Professor, CEREMADE,
Universite´ Paris Dauphine, 75775 Paris cedex 16,
France e-mail: xian@ceremade.dauphine.fr. Nicolas
Chopin is Professor, CREST-ENSAE, INSEE, 92245
Malakoff cedex, France e-mail: nicolas.chopin@ensae.fr.
Judith Rousseau is Professor, CEREMADE, Universite´
Paris Dauphine, 75775 Paris cedex 16, France e-mail:
rousseau@ensae.fr.
This is an electronic reprint of the original article
published by the Institute of Mathematical Statistics in
Statistical Science, 2009, Vol. 24, No. 2, 191–194. This
reprint differs from the original in pagination and
typographic detail.
sure as an invariant loss function, even though the
necessity of scaling this measure and of selecting the
subsequent bound between acceptance and rejection
remain strong impediments against adopting this al-
ternative. (The fact that it depends on the sample
size n is certainly a major drawback, although one
could reasonably object that the bound between ac-
ceptance and rejection associated with the Bayes
factor should also depend on the sample size.)
2. ON GELMAN’S COMMENTS
We first apologize to the authors of Gelman et al.
(2001) for not ranking them into the “classics” of
our first footnote. This choice was, however, delib-
erate: we wanted to stop short of comparing the
most recent textbooks of the late 1990s (excluding
as well Robert, 1994). At a more foundational level,
the debate about the choice of a noninformative or
of a weakly informative prior is endless, hopeless
and possibly fruitless, in that (a) there is no way a
single perfect noninformative prior can be adopted
by one and all except through a formal decision
from the community to always use Jeffreys prior as
a default (in the same way the Black-and-Scholes
formula is used by financial analysts as a common
ground, not as a representation of real series); and
(b) noninformative and informative priors are not
two well-separated categories, they form a contin-
uum. It seems thus more fruitful to try to build mea-
sures that assess of the impact of a given prior (or of
the variation of a parameter in a family of priors).
The debate about complexity is more in line with
our views: (a) similar to the notion of a universal
noninformative prior, a practical implementation of
1
2 C. P. ROBERT, N. CHOPIN AND J. ROUSSEAU
the Ockham’s razor does not exist; and (b) com-
plexity is quite a subjective factor. This is not to
say that we reject the Jeffreysian tenet that Bayes
factors naturally downweight complex models with
limited support from the data, since we support this
point, but rather that the support for more complex
models should come from the prior or from a loss
function, rather than from the complexity-hungry
likelihood. (The social scientist attitude that worries
about missing some factor could also be questioned
as being too optimistic in its belief in models.) Fi-
nally, we concede that Bayesian data analysis may
force us to move away from the “ideal” standards set
by Harold Jeffreys’s Theory of Probability, including
the reliance on the Bayes factor. Bayesian model
criticism, indeed a major direction in Gelman et al.
(2001), is still in its infancy and would correctly re-
quire more emphasis in our papers and in our prac-
tice! As put by Professor Gelman, we need to learn
more from “the failures of a statistical model’s at-
tempt to capture reality.”
3. ON KASS’ COMMENTS
We are grateful to Professor Kass for his com-
ments that follow a talk given during the Harold
Jeffreys’s Theory of Probability anniversary session
at the O-Bayes 2009 meeting. There is actually very
little we can disagree with in these comments which
show a deep and scholarly knowledge of Theory of
Probability and expose our need to pursue our study
of this profound book.
The connection with geometry was bound to be
part of Professor Kass’ comments and we do agree
with the essential feature of looking for orthogonal
parameterisation, a point which, in our awkward
phrasing, we would relate to the search for a con-
stant information parameterization. We also appre-
ciate the emphasis on Laplace’s approximations that
permeate the book and provide an early link with
Bayesian asymptotics. The epistemological implica-
tions of Theory of Probability are certainly worth
stressing (a point also made by Professor Zellner)
if only because Harold Jeffreys was first and fore-
most a physicist who developed his own statistical
tools to deal with his own physics problems. The
specific points made by Professor Kass about the na-
ture of statistical models would be worth emphasis-
ing during any course in applied and even method-
ological statistics (as are the central discussions by
Erich Lehmann and David Cox in the 1990 volume
of this journal). That Bayesian testing, or any kind
of testing, remains a source for discussion and fur-
ther research is clearly illustrated by the number of
comments and the variety of proposals on this point.
Finally, the lack of decision theory is an issue that we
also deplore, in agreement with Professors Bernardo
and Lindley as well, if not Professor Zellner.
4. ON LINDLEY’S COMMENTS
Besides so kindly contributing to the discussion
therein, Professor Lindley patiently and helpfully
enlightened us on the construction and contents of
Theory of Probability during the preparation of the
paper. We are therefore deeply indebted to him for
sharing so much with us. His comments bring a
unique perspective to the discussion, both from his-
torical and foundational viewpoints. As a witness
of the early developments of Theory of Probabil-
ity, Professor Lindley exposes the philosophical cum
practical reasons for the composition of this book.
The point about Section 3.10 and the integration
over the sample space was missed in our analysis but
is indeed crucial in its link with the likelihood prin-
ciple that does not appear per se in Theory of Proba-
bility. Nowadays, this is certainly the most standard
example that illustrates how the principle for con-
structing Jeffreys’s priors may violate the likelihood
principle (Berger and Wolpert, 1988). (The opposi-
tion with deFinetti’s perspective is also worth notic-
ing, since they approached Bayesian statistics from
fundamentally different perspectives, even though
their respective books share the same title.)
The fact that uncertainty must be analyzed in
probabilistic terms is certainly a driving force in
Theory of Probability and a convincing reason to
follow Bayesian ways. We completely agree that this
formalization is one of Harold Jeffreys’s great inputs.
Once again, the other fundamental input stressed
both by Professor Lindley and ourselves is the com-
plete formalization of a coherent approach to testing
via Bayes factors. Professor Lindley is 100% correct
in his assessment of the opposition of this view with
Popper’s and of its persistence (Templeton, 2008):
rejecting a model based on its “falsity” is only feasi-
ble when considering the available alternatives. That
Theory of Probability does not directly dwell on de-
cisions is clearly a feature of the time, even though
Keynes had opened the way a few years earlier, but
this did not prevent a formalization of Bayesian test-
ing procedures that proved itself compatible with
“0–1” loss functions, thus showing the insight in
Harold Jeffreys’s intuitions.
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5. ON SENN’S COMMENTS
Given the tone of some earlier comments of Pro-
fessor Senn on the Bayesian paradigm, we must ac-
knowledge our pleasant surprise at his conciliatory
tone in these comments. Thankfully, the barbed par-
ody of Harold Jeffreys’s most quoted sentence some-
how re-establishes the balance! We are quite grate-
ful to Professor Senn for his laudatory remarks, even
though we must acknowledge that our copies of
Harold Jeffreys’s Theory of Probability are also full
of pencil annotations and question marks, and also
that it took two series of lectures to achieve this
incomplete state of awareness. We furthermore en-
joyed the mention that Harold Jeffreys considered
Bayesian significance tests as the most important
part of Theory of Probability, since this agrees with
both Professor Lindley’s and our perceptions.
We dearly appreciate the further historical de-
tails provided by Professor Senn’s comments, partic-
ularly in that the exchange between Ronald Fisher
and Harold Jeffreys is represented in much less a
controversial tone that we could have believed! [The
first author also commented on Berger, Bernardo
and Sun (2009) about the particular matter of the
Law of Succession and so we do not need to re-
peat the comments here.] Similarly, the confusion
about Bernoulli shows how amateurish is our at-
tempt at Science History. We are equally grateful to
Professor Senn for pointing out Bartlett’s connec-
tion, as we must confess we were not even aware of
it! When reading Bartlett’s comments, we came to
realize his contribution to the exclusion of improper
priors for Bayes factors, as analyzed in deeper de-
tails by Bickel and Ghosh (1990).
6. ON ZELLNER’S COMMENTS
Unsurprisingly, Professor Zellner’s comments—that
he delivered quite enthusiastically during his lecture
at O-Bayes 2009—are opening new vistas on The-
ory of Probability, while differing from our analysis
on several points. The first issue is that Theory of
Probability was aimed at scientists at large, while
we read it as statisticians. This is unavoidable, given
our background and, further, we doubt many non-
statisticians would have the time and the will to go
through Theory of Probability. Unfortunately, most
of them seem to eschew modern Bayesian introduc-
tions to the benefit of shorter reviews published in
their own discipline. We completely agree with Pro-
fessor Zellner that we failed to understand the his-
torical undercurrents explaining the connection of
Theory of Probability with the philosophy of science
at the time it was written. This is not to say we
missed the global impact of Theory of Probability on
scientific modeling and its definition of induction, a
point already stressed by Professor Kass, because it
obviously represents the major impact of the book,
but the style of the discussions about the axiomatic
nature of probability and our lack of background in
this area led us to bypass them to focus on the link
with modern Bayesian statistics. (Neither does the
“proof” of Bayes’ theorem strike us as ultimately
necessary, once the axiomatic definition of probabil-
ity is agreed upon.) The coherence of the system for
scientific induction presented in Theory of Probabil-
ity is what struck us the most in Theory of Proba-
bility, even though we presumably skimmed too fast
over this point.
As already noted (with a different twist) in the dis-
cussion about Professor Gelman’s comments, there
is no end to the debate about non-informative pri-
ors and, while Professor Zellner’s maximal data in-
formation prior is an interesting alternative to Jef-
freys’s, Laplace’s and Haldane’s solutions, there is
no reason to believe the community as a whole will
eventually agree upon this point. We obviously ap-
preciate the derivation of this prior based on a spe-
cific information criterion developed by Professor
Zellner. In a historical perspective, it may well be
that the notions of “objective” or “noninformative”
are not appropriate for the (Statistics of the) mid-
1930s.
The conclusion presented by Professor Zellner re-
produces Seymour Geisser’s assessment of Theory
of Probability, for which we are both grateful and in
complete agreement.
7. CONCLUSION
We are most grateful to the contributors for their
lively discussions, which illustrate how influential
Jeffreys’s ideas still are today. Maybe the most strik-
ing aspect in Theory of Probability is Harold Jef-
freys’s intuition that a completely coherent system
could be designed for Bayesian analysis, a system
upon which we are still building today.
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